In Bourdieu’s account of social practice, deliberation can harbour subtle forms of symbolic violence (and thus of domination) in ways which neo-republican theory struggles to account for. In this article, I consider a countervailing view shared by two otherwise very different theorists - Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Accordingly, a deliberative public sphere is seen as necessary to foil domination in politics. Neo-Roman republicans such as Philip Pettit value deliberation primarily for its role in rendering coercive political authority non-arbitrary and thus non-dominating. Indeed, Rousseau goes so far as to claim that, despite its many dangers, the need for recognition is a condition of nearly everything that makes human life valuable and that elevates it above mere animal existence: rationality, morality, freedom - subjectivity itself - would be impossible for humans if it were not for amour-propre and the relations to others it impels us to establish.ĭeliberation is widely viewed as being intrinsic to republican citizenship. Yet Rousseau also argues that solving these problems depends not on suppressing or overcoming the drive for recognition but on cultivating it so that it contributes positively to the achievement of freedom, peace, virtue, happiness, and unalienated selfhood. One of Rousseau's central theses is that amour-propre in its corrupted, manifestations - pride or vanity - is the principal source of an array of evils so widespread that they can easily appear to be necessary features of the human condition: enslavement, conflict, vice, misery, and self-estrangement. This book reconstructs Rousseau's understanding of what the drive for recognition is, why it is so problematic, and how its presence opens up far-reaching developmental possibilities for creatures that possess it. Amour-propre is the passion that drives human individuals to seek the esteem, approval, admiration, or love - the recognition - of their fellow beings. This book studies Rousseau's rich and complex theory of the type of self-love (amour propre) that, for him, marks the central difference between humans and beasts. For Smith, it is emulation rather than envy which is the driving force of the progress of society. Rousseau thinks that envy increases with wealth and inequality and thus pervades commercial societies, while Smith sees envy as the exception rather than the rule, and, moreover, does not provide a historical genesis for envy. Here, we identify significant differences between our two philosophers which might explain why they have opposing views on the predominance of envy in commercial societies and on the issue of inequalities of wealth as we show in Part 3. Part 2, then, studies their moral psychology, or the way they understand the relationship between sympathy or pity on the one hand, and comparison and envy on the other. Part 1 presents their quite similar definitions of envy based on three characteristics: envy comes from a disadvantageous comparison with others it is painful and malevolent. We will show, along the lines of Le Jalle (2009), that these similarities end on a divergent appreciation of the importance of envy in commercial societies for, contrary to Rousseau, Smith did not consider envy to be a major threat in commercial societies. Several works (Horne 1981, Dupuy 1992, Force 2003, Pack 2016) emphasize the similarities between Rousseau and Smith’s analysis of self-interest. Conversely, the alternative, non-military and non-materialist ethos in Rousseau’s works is emphasized. The corrupting effects of luxury and the loss of liberty caused by the multiplication of needs are therefore especially highlighted. At the cultural and institutional level, Rousseau’s thought implies a radical transformation that consists in the detachment of self-fulfillment from economic achievements, and the subordination of economic life and interests to other human ends, such as the good and virtuous human life. The development of l’amour-propre can be partly prevented and checked through the cultivation of l’amour-de-soi, conceived by Rousseau as being the source of the humane passions, a clear-sighted reason, and a mature conscience. Contemporary economic systems thrive on this corrupted form of self-love, which is often sugarcoated as ambition, or even courage and vision. This striving for recognition is the direct offspring of l’amour-propre, here translated as egoism. Our contemporary culture has been labelled as one of “greed.” Our challenge, it is argued, is even more formidable if we recall Rousseau’s argument that it is the desire for esteem and fame that is the driving force of modern societies.
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